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Incorporation of the Bill of Rights:
A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response
RAOUL BERGER *
Mr. Michael Curtis has performed a service to scholarship by pointing
out that my attribution of certain remarks to Senator William Fessenden was
wrong, that they were uttered by Senator Garrett Davis, a bitter opponent of
the efforts to ameliorate the Negro lot and hence carry no weight.' How did I
err so grievously? In Alfred Avins' reprint the remarks appear immediately
below those made by Senator Fessenden, and I overlooked the legend at the
side naming Davis as the speaker.2 To explain is not to extenuate, for scholars
are under the duty of the utmost exactituide; their dreams are haunted by the
possibility of just such an oversight. To Curtis' credit, he does not follow in
the footsteps of his oracle, William Crosskey, and charge me with manufac-
turing some evidence to bolster a lost cause.3 Unfortunately, the remainder of
Curtis' article is not equally happy, exhibiting anew his incapacity to weigh
historical evidence and his frequent incomprehension of what he reads, as will
appear.
I. WILLIAM CROSSKEY
Curtis continues to rely heavily on Crosskey and chides me for "totally
ignor[ing]" a "major article" because of blistering reviews of the two-volume
work Crosskey published one year earlier.4 To those reviews he replies that
"Professor Goebel and the other commentators ... wrote not about
Crosskey's article.., but about his book .... As if a leopard can change
his spots! Charles Fairman, whose fastidious scholarship is widely respected,
* A.B., University of Cincinnati 1932; J.D., Northwestern University 1935; LL.M., Harvard University
1938; LL.D., University of Michigan 1978.
I. Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 103 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Curtis, Further Adventures]. His initial
article, Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980), is hereinafter cited as Curtis, Bill of Rights. For my reply, see Berger, Incorporation
of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Berger, Incorporation].
The error, while deplorable, does not vitiate my conclusion, for it is only one bit in a mass of evidence.
2. A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES 232-33 (1967).
3. For example, Crosskey charged that Daniel Call (the reporter of Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5 (Va.
1782)), reporting 45 years after the case was decided, "was simply manufacturing, in ex-post-facto manner, a
little much needed pre-Constitutional usage" to bolster the theory ofjudicial review. W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 960 (1953). The historical facts disprove the charge. 2 D. MAYS, EDMUND
PENDLETON 196 (1952). Henry Hart commented on Crosskey's "readiness... to impute lack of scruple to
others, wholesale." Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456, 1481 (1954).
4. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 91.
5. Id. at 90.
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did write about the Crosskey article and concluded that Crosskey's "pre-
possessed obtuseness to the elementary requirements of scholarly candor is
the most significant feature of his entire work."
6
Nor was I alone in "ignor[ing] Crosskey." Justice Black, who fathered
the incorporation theory in his famous dissent in Adamson v. California,7
writing 14 years "after Crosskey's article," Curtis notices, "unfortunately
did not cite Crosskey.", 8 Black, who clung to his theory despite the Court's
obdurate rejection, 9 would have been eager to embrace any solid confirma-
tion. His omission to cite Crosskey's passionate elaboration of his theory
testifies that Black did not share Curtis' confidence in Crosskey's scholar-
ship. And concerning the subject of "ignor[ing]," Curtis nowhere has men-
tioned Fairman's deadly reply to Crosskey,' though I called his attention to
the fact that "Fairman reduced Crosskey's 'case' to rubble.""
Sinte, however, Curtis charged that in ignoring Crosskey's article I failed
"to come to grips with the strongest case which has been made against [my]
view," 12 and because the idols a man worships reveal something of the man
himself, I shall comment on a Crosskey sample that reveals him to be an
untrustworthy scholar. As early as Barron v. Baltimore13 Chief Justice
Marshall held that the Bill of Rights did not extend to the states, saying that so
momentous a change would have been clearly expressed. 14 Crosskey dis-
misses Marshall's opinion as "without any warrant at all." 15 John Hart Ely
recently wrote, however, "In terms of the original understanding, Barron was
almost certainly decided correctly." 16 Several facts illustrate the original
understanding.
6. Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144, 145 (1954).
7. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
8. Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note 1, at 49 n.22. Curtis remains wedded "to Professor Crosskey's
interpretation, which, unlike others, makes sense out of the debates." Id. at 64 n.137.
9. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959), stated
We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to the States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such.
The relevant historical materials have been canvassed by this Court and by legal scholars. These
materials demonstrate conclusively that Congress and the members of the legislatures of the ratifying
States did not contemplate that the Fourteenth Amendment was a short-hand incorporation of the
first eight amendments making them applicable as explicit restrictions upon the States.
See also McClellan, The Making and Unmaking of the Establishment Clause, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL
REFORM 295, 314 (McGuigan & Rader eds. 1981).
10. Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144 (1954).
11. Berger, Incorporation, supra note I, at437 n.19. Instead, Curtis wrote, "'Fairman's later History of the
Supreme Court .. . Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864--88 (1971) also ignored Crosskey's article." Curtis, Bill
of Rights, supra note I, at 50 n.32.
If ignoring Crosskey is sinful, why does Curtis cite Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul
Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979), Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note I, at 86 n.317, without so
much as a "'but see" to my reply, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L. REV. 427 (1981)? Fora constitu-
tional law professor's rejection of Soifer's critique, see Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Erpression, and
Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 285 n.100 (1981).
12. Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note I. at 50 (emphasis added).
13. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
14. Id. at 250.
15. 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1067 (1953) (emphasis added).
16. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 196 (1980).
[Vol. 44:1
INCORPORATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
To begin with, the first amendment provides "Congress shall make no
law"-Congress, not the states. The legislative history clearly confirms
Marshall. Madison had urged the First Congress to extend the protection of
the first amendment to the states, saying that "the State Governments are as
liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the General Government is, and
therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against"; 7 but he was voted
down. Speaking about freedom of speech and press, Egbert Benson said that
all the Committee of Eleven to whom the amendments had been referred
"meant to provide against was their being infringed by the [Federal] Govern-
ment."' 8 In presenting the amendments Madison explained that "the abuse of
the powers of the General Government may be guarded against in a more
secure manner. . . ."'9 And he added, "If there was reason for restraining
the State Governments [by state constitutions] from exercising this power,
there is like reason for restraining the Federal Government." 20 The prevailing
view was voiced by Thomas Tucker: "It will be much better, I apprehend, to
leave the State Governments to themselves, and not to interfere with them
more than we already do . . . ,,2' That Curtis continues to rely on Crosskey
in the face of this evidence of his wrong-headed categorical pronouncements
speaks volumes about the caliber of Curtis' own scholarship.
22
II. AMENDMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACT WERE "IDENTICAL"
Curtis' unwillingness to face up to unpalatable facts mirrors Crosskey
and is quickly illustrated by his response to the question whether the Civil
Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment were identical. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 banned discrimination with respect to certain enumerated rights:
the right "to make and enforce contracts, to sue ... [to] hold and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of persons and property." ' As the Supreme Court stated
one hundred years later, "The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly
indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited category of
rights . ,,. a The Civil Rights Act was regarded as identical with the
amendment, the latter being designed to protect the Act from repeal and to
embody it in the amendment. 25 Harry Flack, a devotee of a broad construc-
17. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 134-35 n.4 (1977) (quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 458 (1789)) (J. Gales ed. 1836) (print with
running title "History of Congress") [hereinafter cited as BERGER, GOVERNMENT]. In urging rejection of the
Constitution the minority of the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention stressed that it lacked a provision that
"freedom of the press shall not be restrained by any law of the United States," not of a state. C. KENYON, THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS 36 (1966).
18. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (1789) (J. Gales ed. 1836) (print with running title "'History of Congress").
19. Id. at 449-50.
20. Id. at 456.
21. Id. at 783.
22. For citations to other examples of Crosskey's ill-founded dogmatism, see Berger, Incorporation, supra
note I, at 436 n. 17.
23. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
24. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966) (emphasis added).
25. For a more detailed discussion, see BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 17, at 22-23.
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tion of the amendment, wrote, "[N]early all said that it was but an incorpora-
tion of the Civil Rights Bill.", 26 Martin Thayer assured the framers that the
amendment "is but incorporating in the Constitution ... the principle of the
civil rights bill which has lately become a law.",27 Responding to his own
question-"[W]hy should we put a provision in the Constitution which is
already contained in an act of Congress?"-John Broomall said that because
of doubts expressed about the constitutionality of the Act he wished "to make
assurance doubly sure" and "to prevent a mere majority from repealing the
law.",2 8 Curtis waters these statements down: "Some speakers did treat the
amendment as a reiteration of the Civil Rights Bill." 29 No such statement was
ever questioned or contradicted. Why did not a single alleged proponent of
the Bill of Rights protest that reiteration of such remarks would bar the door
to incorporation?
Curtis lamely urges that "[m]ost of the statements ... do not indicate
that the measures were completely identical." 30 That would have been super-
erogatory, for "identical" is defined as "absolutely the same. 3' Curtis cites
only one allegedly contradictory utterance: Thaddeus Stevens "denied that
the amendment and the Civil Rights Bill were identical. That was, as he said,
only 'partly true' ,!32 This citation is a misleading paraphrase of Stevens'
comments: "Some answer, 'your civil rights bill secures the same things.'
That is partly true, but a law is repealable by a majority.",3 3 Of course Act and
amendment were not identical in this respect. Weighing against Curtis' du-
bious gloss of Stevens are some unequivocal statements. George Latham
stated the Act "covers exactly the same ground as this amendment." 34 Henry
Raymond said that Congress proposed the Civil Rights Bill "to exercise
precisely the powers which that [the Bingham] amendment was intended to
confer.", 35 So it was understood by a contemporary of the amendment,
Justice Bradley: "[T]he first section of the bill covers the same [a synonym
for identical] ground as the fourteenth amendment. 3 6
Curtis argues that if "the amendment and the bill were identical," it
"follows that the Civil Rights Bill contained a federal standard of due
process.", 37 That "standard," be it remembered, was procedural, not sub-
26. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 81 (1908) (emphasis added). The
original bill is set out in BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 17, at 24.
27. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2465 (1866) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE].
28. Id. at 2498.
29. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I, at 105 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
31. FUNK & WAGNALL'S DESK STANDARD DICTIONARY (1946); The Oxford Universal Dictionary
defines "identical" as "the very same." OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1934).
32. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 104 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2459).
33. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2459 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 2883 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 2502 (emphasis added).
36. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co..
15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
37. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 106 (emphasis added).
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stantive.38 James Garfield, a framer who had restudied the debates of the 39th
Congress, said in 1871 that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment secured "an impartial trial according to the laws of the land." 3 9 Since
the object of the Act merely was to secure blacks against discrimination, not
to displace undiscriminatory state law, that interpretation meant the "stan-
dard" of the state. 40 That was made plain by Samuel Shellabarger: the Bill
"neither confers nor defines nor regulates any right whatever"; that would
"be an assumption of the reserved rights of the States and the people." It
secures "equality of protection in those enumerated civil rights which the
States may deem proper to confer upon any races."' 4 ' Twice Senator
Trumbull spoke to the same effect.42
Another Curtis argument is that the Civil Rights Bill (as did the Act)
provided "for security of person and property," which would comprehend
the due process clause of the fifth amendment and other provisions of the Bill
of Rights. 43 That overlooks Thayer's assurance that the items enumerated in
the Bill precluded extension "beyond the particulars which have been enu-
38. See R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT*S OBSTACLE COURSE 18-28 (1982).
In 1871 Judge William Lawrence, who also had been a framer of the fourteenth amendment, quoted
Alexander Hamilton: "The words 'due process' have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the
process and proceedings of the courts of justice. They can never be referred to an act of the Legislature."
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1245 (Feb. 1871). Curtis disingenuously renders my citation of Hamilton as
"Berger says that 'due process applied only to judicial proceedings, never to action by a legislature ...."'
Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 112 n. 170 (emphasis added). Even Crosskey stated that "[t]he
fantastic modem development known as 'substantive due process' lay in the future; and there is, therefore, no
more actual warrant for this doctrine, as against the states, under the Fourteenth Amendment .... " Crosskey,
Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1954).
39. CONG. GLOBE APP., 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 153 (1871). 1 have searched the records of the Reconstruc-
tion Congresses and found no broader definitions or objections that the definitions of Lawrence and Garfield
were too narrow. Substantive due process was a judicial fabrication of later times, which the Court itself has
repudiated. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
Against this evidence Curtis says that both Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (an opinion the
Republicans despised), and "the Republican party platforms of 1856 and 1860 read the clause as a limit on the
legislature," Curtis, Further Adventures, supra, note 1, at 112 n. 170, as if earlier party platforms bear on the
intention of the legislators in 1866 and overrule accepted judicial interpretations. Bingham himself referred one
who asked for the meaning of due process to the cases: "the courts have settled that long ago." GLOBE, supra
note 27, at 1089. For the views of the 39th Congress, see BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 17, at 201-08.
40. For example:
mhe due process clause does not protect, by virtue of its mere existence, the accused's freedom from
giving testimony by compulsion in state trials that is secured to him against federal interference by the
Fifth Amendment .... For a state to require testimony from an accused is not necessarily a breach of a
state's obligation to give a fair trial.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947). To be sure, the Court has since repudiated its earlier decisions as
part of its ongoing revision of the Constitution; but as Judge Henry Friendly pointed out, no historical basis
exists for picking and choosing which portions of the Bill of Rights are to bind the states-the "selective
incorporation" approach. See infra text accompanying note 81. See R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE
SUPREME COURTS OBSTACLE COURSE 15-18 (1982).
41. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1293 (emphasis added).
42. Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that if a state did not
discriminate the Bill "will have no operation whatever in any State where the laws are equal." Id. at 476. And he
later reiterated that it "in no manner interferes with the municipal regulations of any State which protects all
alike in their rights of person and property." Id. at 1761.
43. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 105-06.
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merated,'' 44 an application of the familiar maxim espressio unius exclusio
alterius. Notwithstanding, Curtis says, "Why Wilson would have considered
the right to due process as enforceable by the federal government, but not
other rights found in the Bill of Rights ... Mr. Berger does not explain." 45
The "due process clause" may be understood to subsume the Civil Rights Act
provision for the right "to sue, be parties, and give evidence." No compar-
able provision of the Act reached out to other portions of the Bill of Rights.
He himself notes that Bingham's attempt to insert the fifth amendment's
companion "just compensation" clause was rejected. 46 Explicit rejection of
that clause militates against an assumption that the rest of the Bill of Rights
was implicitly adopted. Curtis regards as an "obvious" fallacy the assump-
tion "that a man who had accepted any abolitionist ideas-for example, pro-
tection of the rights in the Bill of Rights and black citizenship-must accept
all, ' 47 for instance, "suffrage for blacks and integration." 48 By the same
token, acceptance of one clause does not signify acceptance of the entire Bill
of Rights. Then too, the Framers of the Bill of Rights were guilty of egregious
supererogation if the words "due process" in the fifth amendment encom-
passed the rest of the carefully drafted amendments. Why an elaborate Bill of
Rights if the due process clause of the fifth amendment covered the ground
completely?
Curtis concludes, "The inescapable implication of the assertion that the
Civil Rights Bill and section one of the fourteenth amendment were identical
is that at least some rights in the Bill of Rights applied to the states prior to the
passage of the fourteenth amendment.", 49 That inference was categorically
rejected by the Slaughter-House Cases,50 and it runs counter to Wilson's and
Thayer's assurances that the Civil Rights Bill covered only "the specific
44. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1151; see also infra text accompanying note 64.
45. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I, at 100-01.
46. Id. at 113 n. 179. Curtis would remove the curse from this rejection by citing an 1897 case that held "'just
compensation" was within the due process clause, id. (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897)), but that decision is only another instance of the Court adding what the framers unmistakably excluded.
47. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at Il1l.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 106. (emphasis added for "inescapable").
50. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872). Speaking of privileges or immunities, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 51-52 (1947), declared, "The Slaughter-House Cases decided, . . . that these rights, as privileges and
immunities of state citizenship, remained under the sole protection of the state governments. This Court,
without the expression of a contrary view ... has approved this determination." And the Adamson Court
added, "It is the construction placed upon the amendment by justices whose own experience had given them
contemporaneous knowledge of the purposes that led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 53
(emphasis added). Respect for a contemporaneous construction was expressed as long ago as 1454. See
Windham v. Felbridge, Y.B. 33 Hen. 4, f.38, 41, pl. 17, quoted in C. K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 193 (6th
ed. 1958).
Curtis shrugs off Slaughter-House Cases: "Both Mr. Berger and I agree that it was incorrectly decided."
Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I, at 121. But our grounds are very different. In unduly narrowing the
scope of the fourteenth amendment by confining it to privileges of a citizen of the United States, Justice Miller
overlooked the reason for this citizenship: it was added to still the controversy over Negro citizenship-the
heritage of Dred Scott-not to alter the content of privileges or immunities, which was identical with the several
privileges enumerated in the Civil Rights Act. BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 17, at 44-49. But he
correctly held that "they have always been held to be the class of rights which the State governments were
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rights named in the section."-51 If the amendment merely was declaratory of
existing federal rights, no constitutional impediment to passage of the Bill
existed. Yet the amendment was enacted in large part to allay gnawing doubts
expressed by Bingham and others whether passage of the Bill was authorized
by the Constitution.5 2 Finally, the privileges intended to be protected were
deemed to be contained in the privileges or immunities clause, about which
Justice Field, joined by three other dissenters, said, "In the first section of the
Civil Rights Act Congress has given its interpretation of these
terms .... the right 'to make and enforce contracts,"' own property, and
have access to the courts.53 The Slaughter-House Cases majority differed in
taking a much narrower view of the amendment.
III. "PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES"
It is time to compare the history of the "privileges or immunities" clause
with Curtis' version. The terms first appear in article IV of the Articles of
Confederation: the people of the different states shall be "entitled to all priv-
ileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states," specifying "all
the privileges of trade and commerce," which limited the general words
"privileges and immunities." The phrase was picked up by article IV of the
Constitution, and very early the courts of Maryland and Massachusetts con-
strued it in terms of trade and commerce. 54 For the Maryland court, Justice
Chase declared that the words had a "particular and limited" meaning, that
is, "acquiring and holding" property. 55 Next came the Civil Rights Bill of
1866: "[Tihere shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities.., but
the inhabitants ... shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, . . . to ... hold, and convey real and personal property,' 5 6 provi-
sions plainly allied to trade and commerce.
created to establish and secure," 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1872), and that this interpretation was not altered by
the fourteenth amendment. Here he erred, for it was altered with respect to the "'enumerated" privileges. See
infra text accompanying notes 131-35. That is my central difference with Curtis.
Curtis also overlooks Senator Trumbull's statement: "[A] man may be a citizen in this country without a
right to vote" or other rights. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1757.
5 1. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1366. For further statements of Wilson, see infra text accompanying note 58;
for those of Thayer, see infra text accompanying note 64.
52. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 429. Bingham "argued that Congress lacked the power to pass the Civil
Rights Bill." Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note 1, at 78; see also, Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 99.
James Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, "recognized that congressional power to pass the
bill was doubtful." Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note i, at 76 (citing GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1115). True, a
division of opinion on this score did exist, but the strength of that view forced adoption of the amendment. See
statements of Broomall, supra text accompanying note 28. "To remove any doubt was one of the reasons the
fourteenth amendment was passed." Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note 1, at 92.
53. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872). Grasping at straws, Curtis maintains that Field
"was more cautious in his appraisal" because he added to the quoted material the statement "or at least has
stated some of the rights which in its judgment these terms include." Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I,
at 121 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting)). That the framers
believed their enumeration to be exclusive was stated unequivocally by Thayer and Wilson, and Field is to be
credited no further than to the extent he reflects the legislative history.
54. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797); Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92
(1827).
55. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797).
56. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 474.
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Curtis' mainstay, John Bingham, protested, however, that "civil rights
and immunities" was "oppressive" because it was too broad; it could apply
to "any of the civil rights of a citizen."-57 At Bingham's insistence the phrase
was deleted in order, as James Wilson, manager of the Bill, explained, to
obviate a "construction going beyond the specific rights named in the sec-
tion," a "latitudinarian construction not intended."58 One can only marvel
that activists like Curtis insist on pouring their own aspirations into the Act in
the face of these unmistakably restrictive assurances. Senator Trumbull,
draftsman of the Bill, read the restrictive cases to the framers. Commenting
on one, he said, it "enumerates the very rights ... set forth in the first
section of this bill." 59 Judge William Lawrence of Ohio, a leading legal the-
orist of the 39th Congress, noted that "the courts have by construction limited
the words 'all privileges' to mean only 'some privileges' "--those "confined
to ... the rights of protection of life and liberty, and to acquire and enjoy
property. ' 60 Thus, the framers were aware that they were employing words
of art. In Yates v. United States6' Justice Harlan stated, "[W]e should not
assume that Congress ... used the words 'advocate' and 'teach' in their
ordinary dictionary meanings when they had already been construed as terms
of art carrying a special and limited connotation." 61 In characteristic fashion
Curtis disposes of Justice Harlan's comments on the pettifogging ground that
"[s]uch a position is essential to Mr. Berger's case because, construed in its
ordinary meaning," the phrase is broader.63 But the point of Yates is that
prior constructions leave no room for the "ordinary meaning," whether or
not that ruling is "essential" to my case. Moreover, Martin Thayer assured
the framers that "to avoid any misapprehension" about what the "fundamen-
tal rights of citizenship" are, "they are stated in the bill," which "define[s]
with ... particularity the civil rights and immunities which are to be pro-
tected by the bill .... [T]hat enumeration precludes any possibility that the
general words ... can be extended beyond the particulars which have been
enumerated." 64 The "sole purpose of the bill," he emphasized, "is to
secure" those "fundamental rights.", 65 Senator William M. Stewart explained
that the Bill was designed "simply to remove the disabilities existing by laws
tending to reduce the negro to a system of peonage. It strikes at that; nothing
57. Id. at 1291 (emphasis added). "Civil rights and immunities, for Bingham, included all rights under state
law as well and might affect schools, suffrage, as well as other subjects." Curtis, FurtherAdventures, supra
note 1, at Il1 (emphasis added). Bingham rejected the terms precisely for that reason.
58. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1366 (emphasis added). See also the statements of Thayer and Wilson supra
at text accompanying notes 51 & 64.
59. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 475.
60. Id. at 1835-36.
61. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
62. Id. at 319.
63. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I, at 94 (emphasis added).
64. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1151. See also supra text accompanying note 44.
65. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1152 (emphasis added). Immediately prior thereto he had explained "'funda-
mental rights" in terms of "the right to make and enforce contracts" and so forth. Id. at 1151.
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else .... That is the whole scope of the law." 66 In an incautious moment
Curtis observes of a proposal in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction-that
the amendment prohibit"discrimination in civil rights"-that "[i]ts general
language failed to take account of and overrule the doctrine of Barron v.
Baltimore that the Bill of Rights did not limit the states." 67
Curtis cannot, however, throw off the influence of Crosskey. For
Crosskey the privileges or immunities of the fourteenth amendment had an
"undeniably obvious"63 meaning and purpose: to impose the Bill of Rights
upon the states. 69 So Curtis-words of art being discredited because they
served my thesis-concludes that "a natural reading of 'privileges or im-
munities' is that the phrase is equivalent to 'rights.' ... These rights, literally
understood, would include all rights of citizens provided for in the Constitu-
tion, including rights set out in the Bill of Rights." 70 To begin with, a priv-
ilege, as Wesley Hohfeld taught, is both different and less than a right. 7' So it
appeared to Bingham. "Civil rights and immunities" had been deleted at his
insistence because it "included all rights under state law"-for example,
"suffrage" and "schools"; 72 and he substituted "privileges" in the amend-
ment, indicating that he too regarded "privileges" as narrower than "rights."
Curtis' claim that privileges or immunities embraced "all rights" in the Con-
stitution flies in the face of the framers' repeated rejection of attempts to end
ALL discriminatory classification,73 a point Curtis studiously ignores. And
his claim also runs counter to Thayer's and Wilson's assurances that the
broader "civil rights and immunities" meant only the specifically enumerated
rights 74 -statements also disregarded by Curtis. It likewise collides with the
Court's statement in Georgia v. Rachel,75 which Curtis again ignores, that the
framers of the 1866 Act "intended to protect a limited category of rights."76
Why did the framers jettison this carefully "limited category of rights" when
they turned to the fourteenth amendment, which was under consideration at
the very same time? No activist, Curtis included, has ever explained this
66. Id. at 1785 (emphasis added).
67. Curtis. Further Adventures, supra note I, at 113 n. 179 (emphasis added).
68. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State
Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 6 (1954) (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1. at 92 (emphasis added). As Justice Harlan points out,
Bingham, in the meetings of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, was "successful in replacing § I of Owen's
proposal, which read: 'No discrimination... as to the civil rights...' - with " 'abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens."' Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 172 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). He replaced civil rights with privileges.
71. W. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J.
16. 55 (1913).
72. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at I I I (emphasis added). See also GLOBE, supra note 27, at
1291.
73. For citations, see BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 17, at 163-464.
74. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 51 & 64.
75. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
76. Id. at 791 (emphasis added). This statement was called to Curtis' attention in Berger, Incorporation,
supra note I. at 440 n.44.
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inconsistency. Actually, the framers deemed Act and amendment to be
"identical." 
77
Curtis suggests that Justice Cardozo used "privileges and immunities" as
"encompassing the rights in the Bill of Rights.", 78 But Justice Cardozo stated
that some of "the privileges and immunities ... have been taken over from
the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought within the Four-
teenth Amendment by a process of absorption.", 79 He did not rely on incor-
poration by the framers, but upon judicial "absorption," a take-over by the
Court "in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed." 80 Of this "selective incorporation" Judge Henry Friendly wrote,
"[I]t appears undisputed" that it has no "historical support .... [Tihe pre-
sent Justices feel that if their predecessors could arrange for the absorption of
some such provisions in the due process clause, they ought to possess similar
absorptive capacity as to other provisions equally important in their eyes." 8'
These materials were spread before Curtis, who, though exercised that
Crosskey should be ignored, resolutely shut his eyes to the unpalatable facts.
Or is it more generous to conclude that he simply does not grasp the distinc-
tion between incorporation by the framers in the amendment and the long-
delayed "absorption" by the Justices?
Curtis cites other cases for the proposition that the "privileges or im-
munities" clause encompassed "the rights in the Bill of Rights, ' 82 overlook-
ing that in 1873 the Slaughter-House Cases83 gutted the clause and that
Adamson v. California84 rejected Justice Black's attempt to read the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment. Curtis notes that in 1876 United States
v. Cruikshank85 held that
the right of peaceable assembly and the right to bear arms were not privileges
secured by the fourteenth amendment.... In April of that year in Walker v.
Sauvinet the Court held that the seventh amendment right to trial by jury was not a
privilege or immunity of national citizenship protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment .... [T]he decisions in Cruikshank and Walker were unequivocal. 86
To be sure, Curtis regards these cases as a "remarkable transformation,"
but his Crosskeyan interpretation of the history is badly skewed. And if we
are to look to the cases, the contemporary decisions should carry the greater
weight, for it has long been established that contemporary Justices were
77. See supra text accompanying notes 23-36.
78. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 92.
79. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Critninal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929,934-35 (1965).
82. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 92.
83. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
84. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
85. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
86. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 119 (footnote omitted).
87. Id.
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better aware of the draftsmen's purposes than later courts.8 Activist en-
thusiasts are apt to forget that even with respect to free speech the Supreme
Court, as late as 1922, held that the Constitution "imposes upon the States no
obligation to confer upon those within their jurisdiction ... the right of free
speech." 89
Curtis charges me with a "strained and bizzare [sic] reading" 9 of
Bingham's statement:
Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that the citizens of
the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States in the several States, and that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law .... 91
My reading of this statement, allegedly, is an "edited version":
Bingham translated the provisions of "article IV that 'the citizens of each state
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States' as
'the provisions in the bill of rights that citizens of the United States shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States .... .' Mr. Berger then comments, "The Bill of Rights contains no priv-
ileges and immunities provision." Bingham never said it did. 92
Curtis maintains that the "second item in the series seems clearly to be
Bingham's summary, not of the Bill of Rights, but of the privileges and im-
munities clause." 93 This is passing strange. "Each that-clause is, or at the
least may be meant as, defining" the antecedent 94-that is, the "provisions"
that entitle citizens to privileges and immunities, and to due process, the third
item. It is Curtis' divorce of "that" from its antecedent that is bizarre, for the
inescapable implication is that Bingham did say that the Bill of Rights entitles
citizens of the United States to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States.
Like Bingham, Curtis persists in converting the article IV citizens of
"each State" into citizens of the United States: "Bingham, of course, read
the article IV provision to mean that 'the citizens of each state (being ipso
facto citizens of the United States) shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens (supplying the ellipsis "of the United States in the
several states")."', When article IV first was formulated, however, the
concept of United States citizenship was yet aboming. And, said the Supreme
88. See supra note 50.
89. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922). For the subsequent "remarkable transforma-
tion." see BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 17, at 270-72.
90. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I. at 108.
91. GLOBE, supra note 27. at 1089 (emphasis added).
92. Curtis, Furtlter Adventures, supra note I. at 108 (quoting Berger, Incorporation, supra note I, at 450
(emphasis in original)).
93. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1. at 109 (emphasis added).
94. H. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 639 (1926).
95. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I, at 97 (emphasis added) (quoting GLOBE, supra note 27, at
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Court, "[T]he text of Article IV, section 2, of the Constitution, makes man-
ifest that it was drawn with reference to the corresponding clause of the
Articles of Confederation and was intended to perpetuate its limitations
.... -,96 Curtis' reference to the "somewhat different language of article IV"
from that of the fourteenth amendment 97 fails to make clear that the former
referred to citizens of "each State," not to citizens of the United States, a
difference appreciated by the framers who made blacks "citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside." If article IV already
comprehended citizens of the United States, the privileges or immunities
clause of the amendment was superfluous. What matters it that "[a]s written,
the fourteenth amendment was essentially equivalent to Bingham's reading of
article IV," 98 when the amendment testifies that it was deemed to supply
something that previously was missing? Curtis concedes that Bingham's read-
ing of article IV as "including those [privileges and immunities] in the Bill of
Rights ... may well have been incorrect," 99 a "radically unorthodox reading
of the original Constitution. "' ' Consequently, it was incumbent upon
Bingham to explain his "radically unorthodox reading" to his fellows in
words that elucidated it "too clearly to admit of doubt."' 0 ' It cannot be
assumed that they understood his "radically unorthodox reading" to re-
pudiate standing law; that requires proof.
Since Bingham is a mainstay of Curtis' argument, it will profit us to
sample the quality of his thinking. Even Crosskey remarked that "ardent men
like John A. Bingham are sometimes guilty of slips and lapses, too."' 02 One
such "lapse" was his citation to the fifth amendment for his draft amendment
provision: for "all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights
of life, liberty, and property." This, he said, "stands in the very words of the
Constitution.... Every word.., is today in the Constitution ....,03
"Every word" was not "in the Constitution"-equal protection was al-
together missing. Again, when Bingham grasped that Barron v. Baltimore'04
held the Bill of Rights inapplicable to the states, he loftily declared that "they
are nevertheless to be enforced and observed in [the] States by the grand
utterance of that immortal man, who, while he lived, stood alone in intellec-
tual power among the living men of his country, and now that he is dead,
96. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920).
97. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 92.
98. Id. at 109.
99. Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note 1, at 86.
100. Id. at 92 (footnote omitted).
101. The Supreme Court, per Justice Miller, refused to embrace a construction of the fourteenth amend-
ment that would subject the states' local concerns to "the control of Congress ... in the absence of language
which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.
78 (1872). For the Adamson Court's approval, see supra note 50.
102. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State
Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (1954).
103. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1034.
104. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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sleeps alone in his honored tomb by the sounding sea" '0 5-namely, Daniel
Webster. A decision of the Supreme Court, in short, must yield to Webster's
"grand utterance"! One need not brand Bingham a "moron";'6 it suffices
that he was ever a stump speaker, substituting rhetoric for lawyerly analysis.
Curtis avers that Bingham "did not agree that Barron v. Baltimore had
been correctly decided" because he "believed the states were required to
obey the Bill of Rights by the oath state officers took to support the Constitu-
tion." 07 This is a pretty example of circular reasoning, of assuming the
answer. Only if the states were bound by the Bill of Rights did the "oath"
come into play. Hence, Crosskey tells us, "Bingham actually drew" a draft of
section one of the fourteenth amendment "upon the assumption that his own
constitutional ideas and those of [some of] his Republican brethren, and not
the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions, were the standing law." 08 One
cannot assume that the "brethren" overruled a constitutional decision sub
silentio. When they deemed it necessary to overrule Dred Scott, the framers,
Curtis observes, "explicitly wrote national citizenship ... into the four-
teenth amendment." '09 He does not answer the question, "[W]hy did they not
'explicitly' write the Bill of Rights into the amendment?""10
Let me now illustrate how Curtis' preference for generalities over partic-
ulars repeatedly leads him astray. He quotes Justice Bradley: "[The four-
teenth amendment ... demands that the privileges and immunities of all
citizens shall be absolutely unabridged [and] unimpaired"; they are privileges
"of an absolute and not merely relative character." " But this sheds no light
on the content of those privileges. Justice Bradley himself did so in 1870:
"[Tihe civil rights bill was enacted at the same session, and but shortly before
the presentation of the fourteenth amendment .... [It] was in pari materia;
and was probably intended to reach the same object .... [T]he first section
,,1 '2of the bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment ....
Again, Curtis would discredit my citation of Trumbull: the "great fundamen-
tal rights set forth in this bill" include "the right to go and come at pleasure,
the right to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and
dispose of property." "' Curtis comments, "Mr. Berger uses this quotation to
105. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1090.
106. Curtis, FurtherAdventures, supra note 1, at 108. Is it unreasonable to say of one who located "equal
protection" in the due process clause of the fifth amendment that he was unable to understand what he read?
See id.
107. Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
108. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History,'" and the Constitutional Limitations on State
Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25 (1954) (emphasis in original).
109. Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note 1, at 97.
110. Berger, Incorporation, supra note 1, at 453.
111. Curtis, FurtherAdventures, supra note 1, at 93-94 (quoting Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v.
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652-53 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No.
8,408)).
112. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co.,
15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408) (emphasis added).
113. Berger, Incorporation, supra note l,at440 (emphasis added) (quoting GLOBE, supra note 27, at475).
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prove there was no room left in the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment for Bill of Rights liberties." "'4 That inference is forti-
fied by another Trumbull statement that citizenship "carrie[d] with
it... fundamental ights... such as the rights enumerated in this bill."" 
5
"Such" means "of the same kind of class," 116 a meaning buttressed by
Thayer's and Wilson's assurances that the enumeration of particulars ex-
cluded the unmentioned. 117 Curtis' divide-and-conquer strategy beclouds the
need for viewing each bit of the evidence in light of the mass of confirmatory
facts. If, as is undeniable, the framers regarded the Act and the amendment as
identical, as Justices Bradley and Field confirmed,"" exclusion of the unmen-
tioned is unimpeachable. The qualification of the general by the particular" 9
ever escapes Curtis.
Curtis rings the changes on the repeated references in the debates to
"life, liberty, or property," 20 as if he had discovered some new Atlantis. But
he persistently neglects to inquire what the framers-not Curtis-understood
by those terms. Thus, he cites Wilson's reference to the "civil rights" ,'2 ' of
the Civil Rights Bill as rooted in the fifth amendment's "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." '2 But in
explaining the "great fundamental rights" to the framers, Wilson read the
Blackstonian triad to them: (1) "The right of personal security" (enjoyment of
life and limb); (2) "[t]he right of personal liberty," consisting in "the power of
locomotion," of moving "without ... restraint"; and (3) "the right of per-
sonal property." 23 And he added, "[T]hese are the rights which this bill
proposes to protect ... '2
With heavy-handed sarcasm Curtis derides my reading that "the framers
of the fourteenth amendment thought the rights to liberty, security, and
property were so inclusive that they included the right to testify, inherit, and
114. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I, at 102 (emphasis in original).
115. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1757).
116. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1970).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 58 & 64.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 36 & 53.
119. This is a variant of the rule that "[specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another
statute .... " D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932). In THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at
268-69 (Mod Lib. ed. 1937), Madison said: "[S]hall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their
full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any significance whatsoever?"
120. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 95, 100.
121. Id. (quoting GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1294).
122. Id. Wilson was mistaken in believing that the fifth amendment applied to the states. Even Bingham
came to understand that such views ran counter to Barron v. Baltimore, see GLOBE, supra note 27, at 108990,
and insisted that the Civil Rights Bill was unconstitutional, supra note 52. Many of the framers agreed with him
and, therefore, enacted the fourteenth amendment. BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 17, at 23 n.12. Curtis'
citation of Wilson's statement that the Constitution "is the never-failing fountain from which we may draw for
the passage of this bill," Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 95 (quoting GLOBE, supra note 27, at
1118), did not represent the considered judgment of the framers.
123. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1118. See also BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 17, at 21-2-.
124. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1117. See also Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note I, at 78. For the rights the
Founders had in mind, they looked to "the common law, as expounded by Coke and Blackstone. ... The
'rights of Englishmen' were not vacuous; instead they were quite well defined and specific." Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119, 154-55.
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contract, but were so narrow that they excluded the rights in the Bill of
Rights." '2 The rights to testify, inherit, and contract had been enumerated
expressly; the Bill of Rights was unmentioned. Curtis does not appreciate
Judge Lawrence's emphasis that "[i]t is idle to say that a citizen shall have the
right to life, yet to deny him the right to labor, whereby alone he can live,"
and to "make a contract" for his labor. 126 A person's rights to testify and to
sue were meant to provide protection against oppression and to secure the
profits of his labor and property. Provision for equal access to the courts was
not meant to authorize federal restructuring of state judicial proceedings. To
the contrary, Trumbull twice assured the framers that if a state did not dis-
criminate the bill "will have no operation," '27 a point also made by Shella-
barger,128 utterances that Curtis persistently ignores. These statements alone
bar imposition of the Bill of Rights on the states.
The right to inherit was an age-old incident of the right to own property
and thus falls squarely within the meaning of "life, liberty, or property."
Curtis remarks, "Mr. Berger chooses to look at these incidents, not the
overarching principles from which they were derived." 129 Resort to "over-
arching" principles does not expand "life, liberty, or property" beyond the
Blackstonian confines to which Wilson directed the framers' attention. The
right to locomotion without restraint does not secure free speech; protection
of life and limb does not guarantee against excessive bail for a murderer; the
right to own property does not ensure trial by jury in a suit concerning more
than twenty dollars. These were additional rights embodied by the Founders
in the Bill of Rights. Curtis' preference for the general over the particular
leads him into a welter of misapprehensions. As John Hart Ely observed,
"[B]y favoring.., the 'general over the particular,' . . . one can convince
oneself that some invocable consensus supports almost any
position .. .. " 130
The contemporary Slaughter-House Cases summed up: article IV "did
not profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its
own citizens. Its sole purpose was to declare" that the rights granted to its
"own citizens... shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other
States" who entered the jurisdiction. 131 "[U]p to the adoption of the recent
amendments, no claim or pretence was set up that those rights depended on
125. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I, at 95.
126. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1833.
127. See supra note 42.
128. Shellabarger said of the Civil Rights Bill, "Its whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to
require that whatever of these enumerated rights ... are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens
alike. ... GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1293.
129. Curtis. Further Adventures, supra note I, at 96 (emphasis in original).
130. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 67 (1980). Terrance Sandalow likewise observes with reference
to "understanding the intentions of the framers" that "[b]y wrenching the framers' 'larger purposes' from the
particular judgments that revealed them, we incur a loss of perspective .... In freeing ourselves from those
judgments we are not serving larger ends determined by the framers but making room for the introduction of
contemporary values." Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1046 (1981).
131. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872).
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the Federal government for their existence or protection.",' 3 With the excep-
tion of a few specific restrictions, "the entire domain of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the States ... lay within the constitutional and
legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal govern-
ment." 33 And the Court denied that it was the purpose of the privileges or
immunities clause "to transfer the security and protection of all the civil
rights ... from the States to the Federal government."' 34 That statement
faithfully reflects the legislative history of the amendment. And the decision
never has been overruled, so that the privileges or immunities clause has
virtually been a dead letter.
3 5
IV. THE BLAINE AMENDMENT
A final example of Curtis' superficial skimming of historical materials-
his treatment of the Blaine Amendment of 1875-is worth examining if only to
clarify an important constitutional and historical event. As Curtis relates,
"The Blaine Amendment had been proposed as a result of concern with the
use of public funds for sectarian schools. Among other things, it prohibited
states from establishing religion or interfering with free exercise of relig-
ion." 136 The Blaine Amendment constitutes striking, contemporary testimony
that the fourteenth amendment was not considered to embrace the Bill of
Rights. Quoting from Francis O'Brien, I set out,
Not one of the several Representatives and Senators who spoke on the proposal
even suggested that its provisions were implicit in the amendment ratified just
seven years earlier .... Remarks of Randolph, Christiancy, Kernan, Whyte,
Bogy, Eaton, and Morton give confirmation to the belief that none of the legis-
lators in 1875 thought the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the religious pro-
visions of the First. 137
The evidence, as will appear, actually is stronger than O'Brien indicates.
Curtis comments,
Randolph, Christiancy, Kernan, Whyte, Bogy, and Eaton were Democrats who
spoke ten years after the fourteenth amendment debates. Four of them opposed
the Blaine Amendment, and several of them suggested that it would violate states
rights to require the states to obey the religious guarantees of the first amend-
ment. 1
38
The "several" states rights advocates confirm Blaine's reason for submitting




135. A. SAYE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 559 (1979).
136. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I, at 114.
137. Berger, Incorporation, supra note 1. at 464 (quoting F. O'BRIEN, JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 116-17 (1958)). Curtis quotes this material in Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note I, at
114-15.
138. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 115 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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official churches. Blaine was among 23 members of the 1875 Congress who
had been members of the 39th Congress, 39 and their actions and testimony
wash out what little weight may attach to the remarks of Bingham and
Howard, on which Justice Black built his "incorporation" theory.
Consider Curtis' dismissal of the Democratic opponents. Senator
Frelinghuysen, an 1866 framer, said that "the people call for an amend-
ment. . ."; the House-two-thirds Democratic--"by a vote of 166 out of 171
(only 5 negatives) declared that to be the will of the people," so that "[t]he
House article very properly extends the prohibition of the first amend-
ment ... to the States." 40 Senator Randolph, one of Curtis' Democrats,
said the Blaine Amendment had won "praise and approval from one end of
the country to the other." 4' These remarks demonstrate the people's belief
that the fourteenth amendment had left state control of religion untouched.
The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill favorably; 142 Judge
William Lawrence, who played a leading role in the 1866 Congress, said, "I
shall vote for this resolution to submit to the States the proposed amendment
to the Constitution. . . ." 14' But the debate bogged down on whether a
Senate amendment to the Blaine proposal was preferable, '4 whether en-
forcement power should be lodged in Congress, 45 and on various objections
to financial considerations,' 46 behind which lurked anti-Catholic feeling.'
47
The 1864 encyclical of Pope Pius IX was read to the Senate; it condemned
such "rash assertions" as "liberty of conscience" and the theory that
"popular schools ... should be free from all ecclesiastical author-
ity ... ." 148 That position could not very well be defended by American
Catholics who, therefore, were impelled to remove the issue from politics by
assenting to an amendment. Although Senator Christiancy, another of Curtis'
Democrats, objected that the taxation provision should apply to private as
well as public schools, he said that the establishment provision "is simply
imposing on the States what the Constitution already imposes on the United
States, and that is all correct."' 49 So too, Senator Kernan, also disparaged by
Curtis as a Democratic opponent, said the establishment provision "has my
most hearty commendation." 150 To brush these men off as Democrats and
"opponents," therefore, is misleading. Not one member, so far as I could
find, affirmed that the matter was already covered by the fourteenth amend-
ment. One and all, in one form or another, considered that it was not.
139. J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 154 (1971).
140. 4 CONG. REC. 5561 (44th Cong., Ist Sess. (1876)) (emphasis added). Senator Morton, a Republican,
said the House "has nearly a two-thirds democratic majority," id. at 5593, a fact acknowledged by Senator
Eaton, a Democrat. Id.
141. Id. at 5454.
142. Id. at 5357.
143. Id. at 5190.
144. Id. at 5593.
145. Id. at 5190.
146. Id. at 5593. The financial issue crowded the pages of the debate. See, e.g., id. at 5594.
147. E.g., id. at 5190.
148. Id. at 5587-88.
149. Id. at 5245.
150. Id. at 5581.
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Virtually the only opposition to Blaine's establishment clause came from
the "several ... [who] suggested that it would violate state rights."' 5'
Thus Senator Bogy stated, "I am opposed to this amendment be-
cause ... it takes from the State that which belongs to it, and for no other
reason," 152 confirming Blaine's testimony that states had been unaffected by
the fourteenth amendment. 5 1 Senator Morton of Indiana, an 1866 framer,
insisted on putting the "no State shall establish" into the Constitution.' 54
Senator Randolph, one of Curtis' Democrats, who said he "had anxiously
worked for the amendment adopted by the House," stated "most men be-
lieve" that the House version "is effective and quite good enough.''55
Another Curtis Democrat, Senator Kernan, likewise was in its favor.' 56
Indeed, Senator Edmunds considered that sentiment to be the position "taken
by the whole body of our brethren on the other side of the Chamber," '7 their
weakness being a "blind adoration... for this House proposition."',5
Despite differences respecting financial treatment of the schools and the en-
forcement power, the Senate voted for the amendment twenty-seven to six-
teen, failing to meet the two-thirds vote required.'
5 9
Regarding our central issue-does the fourteenth amendment incorporate
an establishment of religion clause-the Blaine Amendment postulated that it
did not and proposed to fill the gap. Although Curtis' attempt to undermine
the effect of the Blaine Amendment merely reveals the hand of a tyro, he
unwittingly has performed a service by prompting a search of its legislative
history. That history unmistakably discloses that the people, the House all but
unanimously, and the Senate, by an almost two to one vote, considered that
the fourteenth amendment did not comprehend the first. In brushing off such
evidence, Curtis once more reveals his incapacity to weigh evidence and his
addiction to a Crosskeyan "incorporation" theory, positing that he, better
than the 23 framers, knows what the 1866 Congress intended.
V. CONCLUSION
In his famous attempt to read corporations out of the fourteenth amend-
ment Justice Black, who-not Crosskey-gave birth to the "incorporation"
theory, stated that "the people were not told... they [were ratifying] an
amendment granting new and revolutionary rights to corporations. "'60 The
151. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 1, at 115.
152. 4 CONG. REC. 5591 (1876).
153. Berger, Incorporation, supra note 1, at 464.
154. 4 CONG. REC. 5585 (1876).
155. Id. at 5586.
156. See supra text accompanying note 150.
157. 4 CONG. REC. 5586 (1876).
158. Id. at 5588.
159. Id. at 5457.
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restructuring of state procedures, such as grand jury indictments, was even
more "revolutionary," and that possibility, Fairman concluded, was likewise
not revealed to the people:
I traced all the records that are available.... Governor after governor, submitting
the proposed amendment, commented on its purpose, but never was it suggested
that the federal Bill of Rights would now govern the state....
If the proposed Fourteenth Amendment had been understood to impose the
Bill of Rights, surely the legislatures of states whose constitution or laws would be
struck down would have so noted, and stopped to consider, before voting to
ratify. 161
This is the more remarkable because, as James Blaine recorded of the
"limited categories" Civil Rights Bill, "It required potent persuasion, re-
enforced by the severest exercise of party discipline, to prevent a serious
break in both Houses against the bill."' 62
Bearing in mind that the purpose of the framers was to secure the eman-
cipated slaves from violence and oppression and to safeguard their rights to
exist and make a living, the omission to call to each state's attention that it
was surrendering its control of grand juries, of non-use of indictments, and
other preliminaries to trial, is powerful evidence that no such intention
existed. Crosskey concedes that the contemporary courts "should have given
heed to this fact, but did not"; they were "unaware of the true tenor of the
new amendment .... [This is] a rather shocking, but by no means unique,
indication of the inalertness of the men who composed the Court of the
period"! 63 This about Justice Miller, who had his roots in Iowa politics and
kept his political antennae attuned to the passing scene.'64 What the con-
temporaries of the amendment "shockingly" failed to perceive is an open
book to Crosskey and Curtis, a splendid illustration of their bondage to an
ide fixde.
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